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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
DELAWARE v. WILLIAM A. FENSTERER 
ON P&'l'liiON JUt WlUT OF C&RTIORAIU TO TID SUPUIIB 
COURT OF DELAWARE 
No. 85-114. W October-. lB 
PBRCURWL . 
In tbia cue, the Delaware Supreme Court revened re-
apondeDt 'William Fensterer'a conviction Oil the poouDda that 
the .,tmjesioft of the opiDiOil teediDOIQ' of the proeecution'a 
expert witaela, who wu UDable to recall the buia for hia 
opinion, denied reapoDdent hia Sixth A.mendmeat rl&ht to 
coalroDt tbe witDaaaaa apiDst bim. 498 A. lrl • (1886). 
We coaclude tbat the Delaware Supreme Court milcoDitraed 
the CoDfroDtadon ClauBe .. interpreted bJ the declakn of 
tbil Court. 
I 
........-was COilVicted of murderiDa bia lance, Steph-
allie .bD Swift. The State's cue waa baaed OD c:ileaJMtn· 
till evldeace, llld proceeded on the theory that reepcmdent 
W ........ Swift with a cat leash. To eetahllab that. tlle 
.t IIMia ... the murder weapon. the State aoqht. to prove 
Iiiii& twlattn foaDd Oil the leash were atmDv to Swlrea hair, 
_.__, . ..._..... • fA thole balra hid heeD forel'b1J nmo~ To 
...... the State relied Oil tM teltbmllr fll 
aa.a a. ........,. or the PldiM ._. .. ., 
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fense counsel's cross-examination of the Agent was nothing 
more than an exercise in futility:• Ibid. Since the court 
could not rule out the possibility that Robillard could have 
been "completely discredited" had he committed himself as to 
the theory on which his conclusion was based, it held that re-
spondent "was denied his right to effectively cross-examine a 
key state ·witness." Ibid. Accordingly, the court reversed 
without reaching respondent's additional claim that 
Robillard's testimony was inadmissible under the pertinent 
Delaware Rules of Evidence. We now reverse the Delaware 
Supreme Court's holding that Agent Robillard's inability to 
recall the method whereby he arrived at his opinion rendered 
the admission of that opinion violative of respondent's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause. 
II 
This Court's Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad 
categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court 
statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law 
or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination. The 
first category reflects the Court's longstanding recognition 
that the "literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of 
trial . . . forms the core of the values furthered by the Con-
frontation Clause." California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 
(1970). Cases such as Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), 
and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970), gave rise to Con-
frontation Clause issues "because hearsay evidence was ad-
mitted as substantive evidence against the defendants." 
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. --, -- (1985). Cf. Bruton 
v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). 
The second category of cases is exemplified by Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 318 (1974), in which, although some 
cross-examination of a prosecution witness was allowed the 
~rial court did not permit defense counsel to "expose t~ the 
Jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and 
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to 
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the defense might wish. See Roberts, 448 U. S., at 73, n. 12 
(even where the only opportunity the defense has to cross-
examine the declarant is at a preliminary hearing, except in 
"extraordinary cases" where defense counsel provided inef-
fective representation at the earlier proceeding, "no inquiry 
into 'effectiveness' is required"). This conclusion is con-
firmed by the fact that the assurances of reliability our cases 
have found in the right of cross-examination are fully satis-
fied in cases such as this one, notwithstanding the witness' 
inability to recall the basis for his opinion: the factfinder can 
observe the witness' demeanor under cross-examination, and 
the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the 
accused. See id., at 63, n. 6. 
We need not decide whether there are circumstances in 
which a witness' lapse of memory may so frustrate any oppor-
tunity for cross-examination that admission of the witness' di-
rect testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. In this 
case, defense counsel's cross-examination of Agent Robillard 
demonstrated to the jury that Robillard could not even recall 
the theory on which his opinion was based. Moreover, 
through its own expert witness, the defense was able to sug-
gest to the jury that Robillard had relied on a theory which 
the defense expert considered baseless. The Confrontation 
Clause certainly requires no more than this. 
Although Green, supra, involved a witness who professed 
a lapse of memory on the stand, that case lends no support to 
respondent. In pertinent part, Green was a case in which a 
minor named Porter informed a police officer of a transaction 
in which he claimed Green supplied him with drugs. At 
trial, Porter professed to be unable to recall how he obtained 
the drugs. The prosecution then introduced Porter's prior 
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Green, 399 
U. S., at 152. This Court held that "the Confrontation 
Clause does not require excluding from evidence the prior 
statements of a witness who concedes making the state-
ments, and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain 
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the inconsistency between hls prior and his present version of 
the events in question, thus opening himself to full cross-
examination at trial as to both stories." I d., at 164. How-
ever, the Court also concluded that, in the posture of that 
case, it would be premature to reach the question "[ w ]hether 
Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected Green's right 
to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the appli-
cation of the Confrontation Clause . . .. " I d., at 168. In 
this connection, the Court noted that even some who argue 
that "prior statements should be admissible as substantive 
evidence" believe that this rule should not apply to "the case 
of a witness who disclaims all present knowledge of the ulti-
mate event," because "in such a case the opportunities for 
testing the prior statement through cross-examination at 
trial may be significantly diminished." /d., at 169, n. 18 (ci-
tations omitted). 
We need not decide today the question raised but not re-
solved in Green. As Green's framing of that question indi-
cates, the issue arises only where a "prior statement," not it-
self subjected to cross-examination and the other safeguards 
of testimony at trial, is admitted as substantive evidence. 
Since there is no such out-of-court statement in this case, the 
adequacy of a later opportunity to cross-examine, as a substi-
tute for cross-examination at the time the declaration was 
made, is not in question here. 
Under the Court's cases, then, Agent Robillard's inability 
to recall on the stand the basis for his opinion presents none 
of the perils from which the Confrontation Clause protects 
defendants in criminal proceedings. The Confrontation 
Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the 
prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred 
by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the 
{ Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense 
is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these 
infinnities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the 
attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight 
' 
to lht• w:itrws!l' tt•st imcmy . A,·~nl'clini)'h• we• hold t hut t hc• rul· 
_, . ~". 
nuss1on into cvidf'llCt' nf Agt•nt 1\uhilhu·d 's opinion did not ul'• 
fend tht' Conti·ontnt hm Chu1sc• clc•spitc• his innhilit y tn ,.,.,•nll 
the basis fnr that opinion. 
Tht! Delawnn• Sup•·emt' f"nm·t nlsu nppmu·H tn hnvc• he· 
lieved that tht• prosecution l.n·ent•hcd its "sc• l'inu~ nhlignt inn 
not to obstruct n rriminul dt•fcndnnt 'R t'l'nl'\s c•xuminntion ut' 
t'-Xp~rt tt'stimony.'' 4H3 A. ~d . ut Ht';;l, s t•c•ming ly hc•t•nusc tlw 
prosel'Ution knew in ndvnncc thnt A~t.mt Hohilhml woulcl hu 
urmblc to recall th~ bus is for his opinion wtu.•n he t e~tit\ccl nt. 
trial. While we would ugrt't' thut Robilhu·d'H ll•stimony nt 
the t•oir dire t•xnminution must bt:• taken to huVl' nlt.ll'tl•d both 
the prosecution und tht' defenst• to hit' lupsc of memory, sec 
App. to Brief in Opposition A- 1, we do not think the prosecu-
tion was obliged to refruin from calling Robillard unless it 
could somehow refresh his recollection. Whether or not, 
under state law, Robillard's opinion should have been admit-
ted into evidence, nothing in the J."ederal Constitution forbids 
the conclusion reached by the trial court in this case: that the 
expert's inability to recall the basis for his opinion went to the 
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See United 
States v. Bastanipour, 697 F. 2d 170, 176- 177 (CA7 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1091 (1983). That being so, the pros-
ecution's foreknowledge that its expert would be unable to 
give the precise basis for his opinion did not impose an obliga-
tion on it, as a matter of due process, to refrain from intro-
ducing the expert's testimony unless the basis for that testi-
mony could definitely be ascertained. We need not decide 
whether the introduction of an expert opinion with no basis 
could ever be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to 
deny a defendant a fair trial. The testimony of Dr. DeFor-
est, suggesting the actual basis for Robillard's opinion and 
vigorously disputing its validity, utterly dispels any possibil-
ity of such a claim in this case. 
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the 
Delaware Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re- . 

